

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101  
By RB/O.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90

Mr. Albert McAdoo  
7506 S Mascotte St  
Tampa, FL 33616-2206

HEADQUARTERS 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 24

COMMAND REPORT  
December 1951

Twenty fourth Infantry Division elements were occupying a sector of Line Missouri on 1 December 1951. The 21st Infantry Regiment was positioned on the Division left flank from CT765488 to CT832493; the 5th RCT defended the middle portion of the line from CT832493 to CT870486, and the 19th Infantry Regiment occupied the right flank on the MLR extending from CT870486 to CT890487. The Division CP was located at Korisil, CT829415.

The artillery support plan placed the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 21st Infantry Regiment. The 555th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 5th RCT and the 13th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 19th Infantry Regiment. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired in general support. The 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion (Co.A) remained attached to Division Artillery.

Personnel gains and losses for the period are as follows:

<u>GAINS</u>		
Replacements	141 Officers	589 EM
Hospital Returnees	15 Officers	860 EM
Administrative	14 Officers	118 EM
 <u>LOSSES</u>		
Killed in Action	0 Officers	27 EM
Wounded in Action	2 Officers	143 EM
Missing in Action	0 Officers	12 EM
Non Battle Casualties	15 Officers	707 EM
Administrative	137 Officers	797 EM

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101  
 By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90

Key Personnel losses and gains for the period included:

Bryan, Blacksheer M. Jr. Replaced by Hodes, Henry I.	Maj Gen Maj Gen	Division Commander	Assigned GHQ FE
Hallock, Robert F. Replaced by Hamlett, Barksdale	Colonel Colonel	D/A Commander	Rotated
Warren, Carl K. Replaced by Peterson, Arthur J.	Colonel Colonel	D/A Exec Off	Rotated
Cates, Cecil H. Jr. Replaced by Barker, James W. III	Lt Col Lt Col	G-2 Hq 24th Inf Div	Rotated
Edwards, Wesley B. Replaced by Doherty, Peter J.	Lt Col Major	Exec Off 19th Inf	Rotated
Healy, John J. Replaced by Jackson, John W. Jr	Lt Col Lt Col	Exec Off 5th RCT	Rotated
Dellameter, Benjamin F. Replaced by Drew, Cyrus J.	Lt Col Lt Col	1st Bn Cadr 21st Inf	Rotated
Luk, William Replaced by Harris, Clifford W.	Lt Col Major	Div Provost Marshal	Rotated
Martin, William C. Replaced by Cullison, George B.	Lt Col Lt Col	2nd Bn Cadr 21st Inf	Rotated
Peerson, Willard Replaced by Murray, George H. Jr.	Lt Col Major	Exec Off 21st Inf	Rotated
Ellis, Robert H. Replaced by Joss, Roy A.	Major Captain	S-2 5th RCT	Rotated
Manley, Francis J. Replaced by Broomfield, Robert E.	Major Major	G-3 Air	Evacuated
Pridmore, George M. Replaced by Dillahunt, Chester A.	Major Major	Div Air Officer	Rotated
Post, Charles M. Replaced by Rehm, Donald H.	Captain Captain	S-2 19th Inf Regt	Rotated
Bryant, Goble W. Replaced by Vallaster, John J. Jr	1st Lt Captain	Aide-de-Camp to Commanding General	Assigned GHQ FE

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785/01By RB/C.C.NARA, Date 7/25/90

As the truce talks at Panmunjom were in progress at this time, and as a demarcation line had been drawn up, there was little activity on the front. Both sides assumed an attitude of watchful waiting.

The mission of the 24th Infantry Division was to continue the occupation of Line Missouri and dispatch strong patrols to the north to maintain contact with the enemy.

Daily combat patrols of up to platoon size were conducted to probe enemy positions, and night security and ambush patrols were dispatched; the former to prevent a surprise enemy attack and the latter to attempt to take prisoners.

In conjunction with the patrol activities, all units continued to improve positions by constructing bunkers, emplacements, wire obstacles and laying mine fields.

An imaginary line, Line BILL generally parallel to and at a mean distance of 2000 meters from Line Missouri was established and orders were issued that no enemy be allowed to emplace south of it.

24th Division G-2 sources determined that the 12th CCF Army (Corps) was emplaced in defensive positions, posing the opposition to the 24th. The 31st Division, 12th CCF Army (Corps) was deployed in defensive positions on this divisions' left flank, with the 91st and 92nd Regiments on line from east to west respectively. Each regiment positioned two battalions on line and one in reserve. The 35th Division, 12th CCF Army (Corps) opposed friendly elements on the division right flank, with the 103rd and 109th Regiments on line from west to east respectively. Each regiment of the 35th Division also employed two battalions on line and one in reserve.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101By RB/C.C.NARA, Date 7/25/90.

During the first week of December, all action in the division sector was minor in nature and brief in duration. The enemy seemed content to stay behind his line and wait. However friendly patrols were strongly resisted in attempts to probe CCF positions.

In the 21st Infantry sector, the heaviest action occurred on 7 December when a friendly reconnaissance patrol was engaged by an estimated enemy company vicinity CT798519 (Hill 290). The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and grenades against the patrol and was supported by artillery and mortars. A sharp fire fight followed the initial contact as the friendly patrol returned the enemy fire and called in supporting tank fire. The engagement lasted approximately 2½ hours. Friendly elements finally broke contact and withdrew under cover of artillery fire. An estimated 10 enemy were KIA and 16 MIA.

Action in the 5th RCT and 19th Infantry sectors were virtually nonexistent during the first seven days. No outstanding action occurred.

The enemy launched his first sizable offensive action at 080030 hours December 1951. Initially, the action commenced in the 21st Infantry sector. Following an artillery and mortar preparation, elements of an estimated two companies, attacking simultaneously from the northwest, northeast, east southeast and south were first engaged by a security patrol vicinity CT776510 ahead of the main OPLR position on Hill 424. The security patrol withdrew to the main platoon position on Hill 424 (CT771515). The enemy breached the barbed wire barriers in front of friendly positions with wire cutters and bangalore torpedoes. Two enemy positions were set up to block reinforcement of the defending force from the MLE. Eight enemy MG's and an undetermined number of mortars

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, UNN 785/01By RB/p.c.NARA, Date 7/25/90.

supported the attack. The friendly platoon, supported by a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire beat off three determined enemy attacks. At 0400 hours the last CCF effort was thwarted and the enemy withdrew. Enemy casualties for the action were 10 KIA counted, 20 KIA estimated, and 35 WIA estimated. Three (3) prisoners of war were captured. Friendly casualties totaled 5 KIA and 13 WIA.

Prisoner of War interrogation revealed that elements of the 93rd CCF Regiment, 31st Division constituted the attacking force. This unit was believed to be a reserve element occupying positions three miles North of Kumsong. The enemy evidently still adheres to the policy of committing reserve elements in an offensive action, so as to maintain the normal strength of his MLR position in case of counter attack.

In the 5th RCT sector, a company sized outpost was attacked by 30 enemy on the night of 8 December. The enemy force approached from the South, moving through a saddle that separated the outpost from the main position. After severing communication wires, they breached the wire entanglements by infiltrating through an opening used by friendly troops for resupply purposes. The CCF unit was discovered by friendly elements close to the outpost and a sharp firefight ensued. The enemy patrol leader succeeded in placing himself on top of a bunker from where he directed the fire of his men. A machine gun, shifted from a forward position on the outpost, was brought to bear on the enemy leader and he was subsequently killed and the leaderless CCF troops quickly withdrew. The enemy suffered 8 counted KIA and 9 estimated KIA, Twelve were estimated WIA.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101  
 By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90.

No singular action occurred in the 19th Regimental sector. Patrols were dispatched, but activity was negative.

Throughout the period 9 - 14 December, action across the division front again approached a point of stagnation. All friendly units continued to improve fortifications and to conduct daylight combat and night security patrols. Patrols in the 5th RCT sector reported that the enemy had established and manned a bunker near one of their outpost positions. As the enemy position was on the south side of Line Bill, (the imaginary line which Div Hq directed that no enemy positions would be south of), it was decided to send out a force to destroy the emplacement. On 100658 hours, a platoon sized combat patrol from the 5th RCT assaulted the position. After a brief, intense fire fight, the enemy was dislodged and the position destroyed. This action was the only notable contact during the period.

The period 15 - 22 December saw an increase in the amount of activity undertaken by the division.

In the 21st Regimental sector, patrol reports and aerial observation indicated that the enemy had occupied Hill 364, (CT824520). As this Hill is south of the Line Bill, the Regiment was ordered to clear all enemy from the area.

A combat patrol consisting of a reinforced platoon was dispatched on the morning of 18 December to accomplish this mission. Initial contact with CCF elements was made at 0810 hours as friendly elements approached the objective area. An estimated two enemy squads employed small arms and automatic weapons plus hand grenades against the patrol and a moderate fire fight followed. The patrol withdrew approximately one hundred yards and adjusted 4.2 mortar fire on the enemy positions. Three enemy bunkers

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, UNN 785101  
 By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90.

were destroyed by 75mm recoilless rifle fire. The patrol disengaged and returned to friendly lines at 1158 hours without securing the objective.

A second patrol was dispatched on 20 December to secure the same area, (Hill 364). The friendly platoon met resistance from an estimated enemy squad, and overran the opposition and occupied the objective without delay. The patrol remained on the objective for a two hour period, receiving a moderate amount of enemy small arms and mortar fire from the CCP positions to the north. The patrol was ordered to withdraw at 1200 hours.

In the 5th BCT and 19th Infantry sectors, patrol activities were stepped up in order to gain more detailed information as to the location of enemy defensive positions. The majority of patrolling elements contacted the enemy, but the engagements were very brief on the whole. The enemy appeared content to stay strictly on the defensive during the entire period. Although he heavily resisted any friendly probing attacks, he refused to commit himself in any offensive actions.

On the night of 22 December the enemy initiated a propaganda campaign calculated to depress the spirits of friendly troops during the Christmas Season. Christmas stockings filled with propaganda leaflets and Christmas cards were hung on trees and deposited along patrol routes. On 25 December, the Chinese moved a loud speaker up to the front and played Christmas carols to the UN forces. The audience did not seem appreciative and concert was cut short by friendly artillery.

The days from 26 to 30 December were again relatively quiet. Friendly patrols roamed the no mans land to the division front constantly, but were

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101By RB/C.C.NARA, Date 7/25/90.

quickly and sharply engaged whenever they neared enemy positions. As the month drew to a close CCF elements still seemed content to sit and wait.

On 31 December, each regiment conducted an attack by fire on prearranged targets in the Regimental sectors. The results of all three attacks were thought to be highly satisfactory. Coverage in all target areas was comprehensive and due to the fact that no attacks by fire had been undertaken for four weeks prior to this attack the enemy had been roving behind their lines more freely than heretofore, it was thought that a maximum number of casualties were inflicted. Action for the December period was terminated by the attacks by fire.

Word was received from higher headquarters on 26 December that the 24th Division would be replaced by the 40th Division. The relief was to be accomplished sometime in January. An advanced party of 26 Officers and 37 EM of the 24th Division was dispatched to Japan and a 40th Division advanced party of 160 Officers and men arrived in the division sector.

The logistical situation was stable throughout the month. Class I supply was normal and rations continued to be of excellent quality and in sufficient quantity. The Christmas holiday was highlighted with an excellent turkey dinner served with all the trimmings.

Class II and IV supply activities were normal. All phases of winter clothing having been issued, the C-4 section made plans to give sufficient winter clothing to the 24th Replacement Company so that all men could be completely outfitted prior to being sent forward. As soon as the pipe line is filled, all men going either direction will be completely equipped.



DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, UND 785/01By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90.

The increasing low temperatures, rail priorities for other movements, along with the apparent waste of Class III supplies gave cause for the institution of a division wide gasoline conservation program whereby each unit was required to compute an estimate of the number of gallons of gasoline needed for the month of January 1952, giving breakdown subrequirements. Organic division units were given a maximum operating allowance which was not to be exceeded except on orders from this headquarters. Although there were some exceptions made for unusual circumstances, the program was well complied with and effected a savings of 163,000 gallons of Mogas for the period 20 - 31 December 1951.

No major transportation difficulties were encountered during the month. The engineers did an effective job of maintaining the roads throughout the division sector. The heavy influx of Christmas mail and packages placed some burden on division trucking facilities.

Despite cold and snow and ice, there were very few cases of cold casualties. Sufficient clothing and a policy of lessening the time patrolling and observation elements spent in a static position were largely responsible for keeping cold injuries to a minimum.

In the field of communications during the month, there was an outstanding development in the increased use of listening devices. The device, constructed of a microphone and receiving set was utilized frequently on outposts and security and night ambush patrols. The microphone is placed in likely avenues of approach beyond the OPLR. Mortar concentrations are zeroed in near the approaches and when sounds of approaching enemy are

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 785101  
 By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90.

identified, fire is brought to bear. These listening devices proved highly satisfactory.

The efficient operation of a battalion or regimental command post in the field depends in part upon adequate lighting facilities. Electric generators as authorized in the current T O & E for the headquarters of an Infantry Regiment or Battalion do not have a sufficient capacity to carry the necessary load for operations after dark. It is recommended that electric generators of a sufficient capacity to permit operations be included in the T O & E for the headquarters of Infantry Regiments and Battalions. The recommended size for the Regimental headquarters is a 30 KW electric generator and for a Battalion headquarters, a 15 KW electric generator.

PAUL D. ADAMS  
 Brigadier General, USA  
 Commanding