

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, UNN 785101
 By RB/C.C. NARA, Date 7/25/90

Mr. Albert McAdoo
 7506 S Mascotte St
 Tampa, FL 33616-2206

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Headquarters
 24th Infantry Division
 Korisil (CT832417)
 Korea
 3 January 1952

As the month of October 1951 drew to a close, front line elements of the 24th Infantry Division were busily engaged consolidating positions on the newly acquired MLR and OPLR. Daily patrols were dispatched into enemy territory to keep the enemy off balance and ascertain his intentions. During the October period the 24th Division had penetrated approximately ten (10) miles ~~farther~~ into North Korea, fighting a stubborn, well emplaced enemy all the way.

On 1 November 1951 the 24th US Infantry Division sector extended generally from CT750484 to CT800491 to ~~CT870495~~. (See Annex "A"). The 21st Infantry Regiment was deployed over the left (west) flank of the division, the 5th RCT in the center and the 19th Infantry Regiment on the right (east) flank. Elements of each regiment manned positions on the Outpost Line Of Resistance approximately 1500 meters forward of the MLR. 24th Infantry Division Artillery employed the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 21st Infantry Regiment, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 5th RCT, the 13th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the 19th Infantry Regiment and the 11th Field Artillery Battalion in general support, reinforcing the fires of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion.

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Elements of the 3rd Engineer (C) Battalion were hard pressed throughout the period to keep abreast of their missions. The Engineers were engaged in widening the MSR, building, improving and maintaining access roads to regimental units, constructing bridges over the many crossings of the Kumsong River and establishing field fortifications on Line POLAR.

The Colombian Infantry Battalion, the 26th Infantry Scout Dog Detachment and the 388th Chemical Smoke Generator Company, 1st Section, 1st Platoon, were attached to the 24th Division during the month.

Continuation of the rotation program, good mail service, adequate showings of motion picture films, and an above average supply of "PX" items, all contributed to a high morale standard within the division. Divisional operated schools continued to funnel critical technical personnel such as cooks, ordnance technicians and signal specialists into the various units. A shortage of qualified radio repairman, and other NCO personnel is still evident within the division.

Division strength increased slightly during the November period, with the actual present for duty strength figure standing at 18,932 at the beginning of the period and 19,257 at the close.

Personnel gains and losses for the period are as follows:

GAINS

Replacements	- 191 Officers	- 1848 EM
Hospital Returnees	- 25 Officers	- 849 EM
Administrative	- 9 Officers	- 105 EM

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Killed In Action	-	0 Officers	-	45 EM
Wounded In Action	-	7 Officers	-	276 EM
Missing In Action	-	0 Officers	-	4 EM
Non Battle Casualties	-	21 Officers	-	813 EM
Administrative	-	128 Officers	-	1408 EM

Key Personnel losses and gains for the period included:

Brig. Gen. Numa A. Watson	Asst Div Com	Rotated	Replaced by
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Adams.			
Lt. Col. Charles J. Hahn	Div Ord Off	Transferred	Replaced by
Lt. Col. William J. Judson.			
Lt. Col. Edward H. Murray	19th Inf Bn	Rotated	Replaced by
Maj. Joseph H. Jones.	Exec Off		
Maj. Jack T. Pink	S-1, 19th Inf	Rotated	Replaced by
Maj. Joseph J. Caruso.	Regt		
Maj. Harold M. Hull	Bn EXEC Off	Rotated	Replaced by
Maj. John P. Campbell.	52nd FA Bn		
Maj. Rodger Hudson	S-1, 5th Inf	Rotated	Replaced by
Capt. John F. Kauffman.	Regt		

The three regiments were occupied in carrying out the division mission on 1 November 1951. Positions on Line POLAR and the OPLR were being completed, and defenses improved. Aggressive patrols were conducted to maintain firm contact with the enemy, to determine his strength, disposition and intentions.

The 24th Division G-2 Section stated that elements of the 67th and 68th CCF Armies (Corps) were the units opposing the division. The 609th Regiment, 203rd Division, 68th CCF Army (Corps) was facing the left front of the 24th Division, the 603rd Regiment, 201st Division,

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67th CCF Army (Corps) occupied the center of the line, and the 606th Regiment, 202nd Division, 68th CCF Army (Corps) defended the right sector.

The 5th RCT dispatched a strong combat patrol to seize a hill top vicinity CT819534 on the first of November. The patrol, composed of Company "E," with the organic Tank Company and one platoon of 4.2" heavy mortars in direct support, approached the objective from the valley to the west, where the tanks could be employed to best advantage. (See Annex "A"). The walking elements ~~came~~ under small arms and automatic weapons fire as they approached the base of the objective and the supporting tanks drew moderate artillery and mortar fire on their positions in the valley. The patrol won the objective after an hours advance under fire. Nine (9) enemy dead were left on the hill crest and another squad had been dislodged and driven northward. The patrol was ordered to return to friendly positions shortly after the hill was reported secured.

The company size patrol conducted by the 5th RCT was the only notable action to break the routine of the first six (6) days of the month. All front line elements conducted day and night patrols which made intermittent contacts with the enemy. Daylight hours were utilized to construct and improve positions on the MLR. Squad size groups of Chinese probed friendly positions nightly but seemed reluctant to attempt any advance after being fired on.

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A Colombian Battalion patrol was dispatched to vicinity CT748498 on 6 November, to corroborate a statement made by a CCF prisoner of war to the effect that there were approximately 100 CCF troops in that area. The suspected location was approximately 1000 meters west of a Colombian position on the OPLR, (Hill 500). The patrol reconnoitered the area and returned to friendly positions after contacting enemy troops near the location given by the POW. Orders were issued for the Colombian Battalion to conduct a combat patrol of one reinforced company to clear the enemy from the area.

The combat patrol crossed the IP at 0630 hours, 7 November. The plan of attack was to fix the enemy by fire with a frontal attack and envelop the position from the left with one platoon to cut the enemy's escape route. The patrol received long range small arms fire from the crest of Hill 500 as it approached enemy positions. Artillery was placed on the enemy, reducing the effectiveness of his fire, and the patrol continued to advance. Firm contact was first established with the enemy by the enveloping element which encountered CCF troops withdrawing from the rear of the objective. Pressure was increased by the containing element but the bulk of the enemy forces completed the withdrawal after suffering heavy casualties from friendly small arms and artillery fire. Fifteen (15) enemy were counted dead as the objective was secured; the Colombians suffered five (5) wounded. The patrol closed into friendly positions at 1350 hours.

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The 24th Division Command Post closed from SANYANG-NI vicinity CT823303 at 1400 hours and opened at KORISIL, vicinity CT832417 at 1400 hours 7 November.

Enemy forces launched determined counterattacks on friendly positions during the night of 7-8 November. The first indication of an attack was evidenced by a heavy enemy mortar and artillery barrage on positions of the 1st battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment at 072200 hours. Initial contact was made at approximately 2205 hours by an enemy squad size probe on Company "A", vicinity CT870506. By 2235 hours the attacking force had increased to reinforced company size. The enemy employed two (2) platoons vicinity CT870506 and two (2) platoons vicinity CT862505. Simultaneously with the attack on "A" Company, an estimated enemy reinforced company made a two pronged thrust on "B" Company. The first two CCF platoons approached from the northeast vicinity CT880499 and the remainder of the company advanced from the southeast, vicinity CT879492. An outpost of Company "B" was forced to abandon a small hill, CT876497 on the extreme northeast portion of the OPL due to heavy enemy action which made the position untenable. The lost ground was regained at daylight by a reinforced platoon from "B" Company. At approximately 0500 the major portion of the attacking force withdrew, however a covering force engaged friendly elements until 080730. The 1st battalion, 19th Infantry suffered eleven (11) Killed In Action and twenty two (22) Wounded

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In Action in the attack. Enemy casualties totaled ninety one (91) KIA counted and two hundred forty five (245) Wounded In Action estimated.

Shortly after the Chinese launched their attack on elements of the 19th Regiment, enemy 82mm and 120mm mortar fire, in heavy volume, began falling on the Colombian Battalion patrol base on Hill 500, (CT759497), in the 21st Regimental sector. The heavy shelling continued for approximately two hours and thirty minutes in undiminished intensity. As the barrage lifted, an estimated two (2) enemy companies attacked the Colombian position from three sides. Despite orders to hold the position, the Colombians were forced to vacate the hill to avoid becoming isolated. By 0325 hours, the outpost had been forced back to the MLR. At 080630 hours two (2) companies of Colombians, supported by one platoon of self-propelled quad .50 caliber machine guns, counterattacked to restore their former position. The enemy resisted the advance stubbornly and enemy artillery disabled two (2) of the Self Propelled "quad .50's." Artillery counter battery fire was placed on enemy emplacements and the SP quad .50 platoon withdrew while the Colombians pressed the attack. At 1300 hours the enemy were driven from their positions and the Colombians re-occupied Hill 500.

At 2130 hours on the night of 8-9 November, a reinforced squad size security patrol from the 5th RCT met 25 to 30 enemy moving down

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the valley in the vicinity of CT826508. The enemy patrol, apparently the lead element of a company that attacked "B" Company from the right rear at 0025 hours, forced the friendly patrol back into the "B" Company perimeter after a brief engagement. At 0120 hours the 24th Reconnaissance Company, on the left of "B" Company, came under attack from their front and rear by another enemy company. Elements of that same company also attacked the "I" Company outpost located at CT813506. All friendly elements had been alerted by the initial patrol engagement and were well prepared to meet the enemy. The attack was repulsed by 0200 hours. Three (3) POW's were captured during the encounter and thirty nine (39) enemy dead were found in front of friendly positions at daylight.

The exact meaning of the sudden Communist offensive action was not discerned at the time of the attacks. However it was known that the action did not assume the characteristics of previously launched limited objective attacks against IX Corps units, in as much as there appeared to be no focal point or single maximum effort for the offensive action. Shortly thereafter, from statements of PsW and other intelligence data it was determined that the enemy used this method to screen the relief of the 67th CCF Army (Corps) by the 12th CCF Army (Corps).

Between 06 - 09 November, the 201st Division, 67th CCF Army (Corps) was relieved by elements of the 31st and 35th Divisions of the 12th

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CCF Army (Corps), 3rd Composite Army Group, arriving from KOKSAN, BT9795. During these dates the 202nd and 203rd Divisions, 68th CCF Army (Corps) were relieved by elements of the 35th and 31st Divisions respectively. The 31st Division employed in defensive positions, appeared opposing friendly elements on the 24th Division left flank with the 91st and 92nd Regiments on line from east to west respectively. Each regiment employed two battalions on line and one in reserve. The 35th CCF Division, employed in defensive positions, appeared opposing friendly elements on the division right flank with the 103rd and 104th Regiments on line from west to east respectively with each regiment also placing two battalions on line and one in reserve. The 12th CCF Army (Corps) had a strength of approximately twenty six thousand, five hundred (26,500) on 06 November and an approximate strength of twenty two thousand three hundred fifty one (22,351) by the end of the period.

Throughout the period 10 to 13 November 1951, 24th Division elements conducted routine patrols and constructed deliberate defense positions on the MLR and OPLR. Barbed wire was strung and mine fields placed in front of friendly positions.

On 10 November, General Orders number 874, Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, were published announcing the re-organization of the 5th Regimental Combat Team. The 5th Infantry Regiment, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion and the 72nd Engineer Combat Company, comprise the combat team. The Regimental Commander was

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informed that this was purely an administrative move and that for the present the 555th Field Artillery Battalion would remain attached to the 24th Division Artillery and the 72nd Engineer Company would not join the regiment.

24th Division boundaries were altered on 15 November. A new zone of responsibility was directed, which extended from CT767487 - CT814488 - CT855484 - CT887477. (See Annex "A").

A combat patrol from the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment was dispatched on 15 November to occupy Hill 533, (CT782534) during the 16th and return to friendly positions during the hours of darkness on 16-17 November. The patrol composed of Company "K" plus a demolition team, departed at 2115 hours. The patrol mission was to estimate the number of enemy in the objective area, report on his deployment, and destroy enemy fortifications on the hill top. Approximately half way up Hill 533 the patrol came under enemy fire. The leading platoon returned the fire and advanced a short distance but was forced to halt by the intense enemy small arms, automatic weapons and grenade barrage. The battalion commander ordered the patrol back to friendly lines after a bitter hand to hand encounter. As the withdrawing patrol reached the base of Hill 533, it received flanking fire from the south and west. Artillery fire was called in on prearranged concentrations and the enemy flanking fire was silenced. The patrol closed into the OPLR at 0325 hours. Friendly casualties were six (6) WIA. It was estimated

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that the hill was occupied by one hundred (100) enemy troops. Casualties inflicted on the Chinese were not estimated.

A reinforced company size patrol from the 5th RCT departed from the OPLR on 19 November to determine enemy strength and disposition on the land mass vicinity CT835010 and the mountain top at CT835510. At 1030 hours the patrol was engaged vicinity CT840507 by an estimated enemy platoon employing two (2) machine guns and small arms, from CT835512. Tank and artillery fire, called in on the enemy positions neutralized the machine gun fire and destroyed enemy positions. An air strike was placed on the second objective, CT835510, killing an estimated thirty five (35) enemy. As the patrol advanced toward the objective, small arms, mortar and artillery fire increased. The patrol was ordered to disengage and return to friendly positions at 1405 hours. It was estimated that the enemy defended the objective in battalion strength.

On 18 November, Operations Instructions were issued from Headquarters 24th Infantry Division, ordering "Attacks By Fire" to be placed on enemy positions to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy and inflict damage to his personnel. An "Attack By Fire" consists of a heavy volume of supporting fires, artillery, mortar, tank, and air, as well as long range infantry direct fire weapons on a small target area for a brief period of time. The success of these attacks depends largely on the sudden and violent initial strike of all weapons,

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which naturally require close timing and coordination. The targets must be carefully chosen in advance and have to be worthy of the great volume of fire that is expended during each brief operation. In order to achieve effective surprise, all supporting fires should be registered hours before the time of the actual strike. As the "attack" commences, all available weapons must be brought to bear simultaneously on the target area. Mortars and high angle artillery work the topographical crest and reverse slopes; 57mm, 75mm recoilless rifles, machine guns, quad .50 half tracks and tank fires, including the 90mm gun, lay direct fire against forward slope targets. The period of intense fire lasts approximately fifteen (15) minutes. The area covered should not be so broad as to make it difficult to achieve a high degree of saturation.

On 20 November, the 21st Infantry Regiment launched the first "attack by fire". The target area was Hill 533, CT782534. At 1400 hours the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion marked the target with two rounds of WP which was the signal for all weapons to commence firing. The 1st and 3rd battalions placed .30 and .50 caliber machine gun and 81mm mortar fire on the target with the 1st battalion covering the west portion and the 3rd battalion firing on the east portion of the objective. The machine guns swept the fringes of the target area while the 81mm mortars and two platoons of 4.2" heavy mortars fired on the forward and reverse slopes. Artillery fires were delivered

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by one battalion of 105mm Howitzers (52nd Field Artillery Bn) and a composite battalion of 155mm Howitzers, (218 and 11th Field Artillery Bns). Artillery fired mixed VT and Fuze Delay. The attack lasted ten (10) minutes. As the ground bombardment lifted, an air strike was immediately placed on the target. The air craft fired rockets on the east half of the objective, napalm in the center and rockets and 20mm cannon fire on the west half and reverse slopes. Ordnance fired by the regiment during the attack was as follows:

4.2" Heavy Mortar	-	400 Rounds
105mm Howitzer	-	540 Rounds
155mm Howitzer	-	186 Rounds
Air Craft	-	3200 Rounds 20mm cannon
		24 Rockets
		6 100 pound GP bombs
		8 Napalm bombs

The 5th RCT conducted its first attack by fire from 1630 -1645 hours on 20 November. The target area was a large hill mass to the regimental front vicinity CT844523 - CT857524. The 81mm mortar platoons and 75mm recoilless rifle platoons of the 1st and 3rd battalions and three (3) heavy mortar platoons displaced to fire on the objective. The Tank Company, with six (6) Self Propelled quad .50 caliber machine gun mounts attached moved into firing positions in the valley just prior to the attack. The 555th Field Artillery Battalion was to fire one third of its daily allocation of 105mm ammunition, and requested support from 155mm Howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion. The 2nd battalion, 5th RCT fired its 75mm

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recoilless rifles from positions on Hill 770.

In the fifteen (15) minute firing period, the following quantity of ammunition was placed on the objective.

.50 Caliber Machine Gun	-	30,000 Rounds
75mm Recoilless Rifle	-	40 Rounds
76mm Tank Gun	-	240 Rounds
81mm Mortar	-	60 Rounds
4.2" Heavy Mortar	-	200 Rounds
105mm Howitzer	-	534 Rounds
155mm Howitzer	-	180 Rounds

The requested air strikes were diverted and could not be placed as a follow up to the ground attack. A Regimental air observer reported 60% coverage of the target with excellent effect on the top and reverse slope of the ridgeline. Enemy casualties were estimated at thirty two (32) KIA's and eighteen (18) WIA's.

During the period 21 - 27 November, the division conducted fourteen (14) attacks by fire on various pre-arranged targets. The three regiments all participated in the attacks and the results achieved were thought to be highly satisfactory.

A message from Headquarters IX US Corps changed the name of Line POLAR to Line MISSOURI, on 24 November.

On 27 November orders issued from division headquarters directed that combat patrolling and attacks by fire would be suspended. Only local security patrols were to be conducted and these patrols were not to exceed reinforced squad size. It was emphasized that these instructions were not to be construed to mean that the division would not in-

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initiate action against the enemy. The enemy was to be fired upon when seen, and engaged when encountered.

The period 28 - 30 November was one of relative quiet. Daylight friendly operations were confined to consolidating and improving positions in preparation for another Korean winter. Security patrols were dispatched but contacts with the enemy were negligible.

The .50 caliber machine gun was put to a new use by elements of the 24th Division during the month. A .50 caliber machine gun, mounted with a telescopic sight was used as a sniping weapon. The weapon was found highly effective at ranges of up to two thousand (2000) yards. In one instance three (3) Chinese were killed and three (3) wounded at a range of sixteen hundred (1600) yards.


It is recommended that artillery ammunition be segregated by lot number in army depots or as far to the rear as possible and transported to ASP's in bulk lots in order that artillery battalions can be provided with sufficient ammunition of one lot number to assure accuracy in registration, precision adjustments, and close-in fires.

The present supply system for processing uncontrolled items of engineer equipment and expendable engineer supplies is not satisfactory. All requisitions are submitted to the Corps Engineer Supply Officer, who after processing, turns the requisitions over to the Corps Engineer Supply representative at the Engineer Depot in Pusan. Supplies are then rail-shipped to a Corps dump, earmarked for the division. However,

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on several occasions there have been considerable shortages in the amount actually received as compared to amounts requested on the issue slips. Also, the time lapse is excessive, since several days are lost in processing the requisitions through Corps Channels. It is recommended that the Division Engineer Supply Officer be allowed to deal directly with the depot except for controlled items of engineer equipment and fortification material.

It is further recommended that an entire platoon of Scout Dogs be assigned or attached to each Infantry Division. The Scout Dog Team, presently attached to this division has proved valuable in detecting enemy during night patrols.


H.I. HODES
Maj Gen
Commanding

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